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The Unique Challenge of Dual-Purpose 
Organizations: Comparative Analysis of U.S. 
and Israel Approaches to Combating the 
Finance of Terrorism 
AVIV (COHEN) DEKEL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Exploring the legal aspects of counter terrorism has for a long time 
now been the “new world” of scholarly writings. Much like the first 
expeditious ships of the fifteenth century, brave legal minds sailed away 
to this unknown legal turf more than a decade ago, paving the way for 
voluminous writing. Today, the legal writing dealing with counter 
terrorism is broad and diverse, covering international law, domestic law, 
criminal law, humanitarian law, and others legal fields. Of particular 
focus for many years in this legal discourse stands the issue of financing 
terrorism. This is due to the centrality attributed to financing in the 
initial stages of orchestrating a terrorist act, and its negative effects on 
the world economy.1 
As terrorists grow more sophisticated,2 the legal instruments 
required to counter them should exhibit at least the same level of 
cleverness. On the international level, various legal tools exist to 
counter different aspects of terrorism, from regional conventions and 
international conventions to Security Council Resolution. Of these 
 
* LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, LL.B. 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prof. David Stewart and Prof. Albert Rees of Georgetown 
University Law Center read the earlier drafts of this article and shared their insightful comments 
and thoughts on the issues it raises. Any mistakes in this final version are those of the author 
alone.  
 1. For further reading on the economic ramifications of terrorism financing, see R. Barry 
Johnston & Oana M. Nedelescu, The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets, 13(1) J. OF 
FINANCIAL CRIME 7 (2006). 
 2. An interesting argument to the contrary was put forward by Professor Gal and Professor 
Taylor, who claim that terrorist acts themselves are not relatively expensive to execute, and so the 
current trend is privatization of terrorist financing. This means that terrorist organizations rely 
mostly on self-financing and not as much on external sources. See Istvan Laszlo Gal & James 
Park Taylor, Financing Terrorism: Afghanistan and the Haqqani, 28 (10) INT’L ENFORCEMENT 
L. REP. 346 (2012). While this argument may stand on solid data, it is also quite narrow in its 
scope of examination. Financing terrorism as a concept includes more than mere expenses of 
detonations, purchase of knowledge and other technical aspects. It also encompasses the money 
invested in recruiting members, propaganda, payment to suicide terrorists’ families and so forth.  
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instruments, two are especially important in the context of counter 
financing of terrorism. These are the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,3 which requires member 
states to create a domestic criminal offense of financing of terrorism; 
and Security Council Resolution 1373, which reinforced that 
requirement and enhanced it by calling on states to take further 
measures, such as freezing assets related to terrorist acts and so forth.4 
On the domestic front, anti-terrorism financing legislation reached 
its most extensive scope yet. In fact, some statutes are so broad, that 
they sacrificed their ability to pay attention to nuances and special 
circumstances in the name of overreaching application. This article 
focuses on one such nuance, the phenomenon of dual-purpose 
organizations—organizations that marry together terrorist and non-
terrorist activities, and compares the application of two anti-terrorism 
statutes to such cases. The two statutes analyzed here are those of the 
United States and of Israel, two nations that are no strangers to terrorist 
attacks and which have well developed anti-terrorism legal schemes.  
Surprisingly enough, this issue has generated almost no scholarly 
writing, leaving a corner of the once “new legal world” still untouched. 
Most of the legal discourse to date deals with international and domestic 
regulation and the instruments used to counter the financing of 
terrorism,5 or with the issue of terrorist organizations exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of charities and non-profit organizations in order to 
receive funding.6 The importance of these issues notwithstanding, they 
 
 3. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197. 
 4. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(c), U.N. DOC. S/RES/1325 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 5. See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in 
International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137 (2011), for a comprehensive analysis of the 
Financial Task Force’s activity in the fight against financing of terrorism. See also Alison 
Elizabeth Chase, Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States 
Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 41 (2004), for an interesting 
comparison between United States law and international law with regard to state responsibility 
for acts of terrorism; see also Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom 
and United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303 (2006) for background on the legislation and policy 
for countering the financing of terrorism. 
 6. See Jennifer Lyn Bell, Terrorist Abuse of Non-Profit and Charities: A Proactive 
Approach to Preventing Terrorist Financing, 17 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 450 (2008), where she 
lists the reasons why charities and non-profit organizations are especially vulnerable to abuse for 
the financing of terrorism; Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing 
of Terrorism and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global 
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004). For insights on this topic with respect to 
Canadian law, see David G. Duff, Charities and Terrorist Financing, 61 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 
73 (2011). An especially instructive presentation on the work of charities in the Arab world is 
found in Mona Atia’s piece on Egypt, where it is argued that “[b]ecause of [the] harsh 
environment [in Egypt], there is no need for anti-terrorism legislation to prevent anti-terrorism 
financing through Islamic charities. While in the international context, including in many Middle 
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lack a direct confrontation with the question: has anti-terrorism 
financing gone too far so as to preclude any funding for social or 
humanitarian projects solely because they are affiliated with a terrorist 
organization?  
Unfortunately, as the argument presented here demonstrates, the 
answer to this question is no. In fact, domestic legislation, at least in the 
United States and Israel, has not gone far enough in preventing dual-
purpose organizations from abusing their non-terrorist fraction for 
purposes of financing terrorism. Dual-purpose organizations do perform 
important social functions, and sometimes they do so in a political 
vacuum, which means that no other governmental entity will take upon 
itself to provide such services. However, in most cases, the main focus 
of dual-purpose organizations are to serve violent terrorist campaigns, 
and so long as it stays that way, regretfully, it is the innocent 
beneficiaries of the aforementioned welfare projects that will suffer the 
consequences. 
The paper consists of five parts. Following this introduction, Part 2 
provides a comparative overview of anti-terrorism financing legislation 
in the United States and Israel. It focuses on the criminal offense of 
supporting terrorist organizations, which in both cases, includes 
providing currency, and examines the elements of both offenses. Part 3 
introduces the concept of dual-purpose organizations and the dilemmas 
they pose. To further crystallize the question at hand, Part 3 puts a 
spotlight on one project, the Islamist University of Gaza (“Islamist 
University” or “the University”), the most advanced educational 
institution available to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which at the same 
time operates under the auspices of Hamas, an organization widely 
recognized as a terrorist organization. Part 4 merges the previous two 
sections together, confronting the question of whether funding a new 
library at the University will be considered an offense of supporting 
terrorism under the two aforementioned statutes. Part 5 concludes the 
discussion, and suggests some lessons learned from the example 
presented earlier on. 
II.  COMBATING FINANCING OF TERRORISM: COMPARATIVE 
PRESENTATION OF UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL LEGISLATION 
In order to evaluate the ability of anti-terrorism legislation to 
address dual-purpose organizations, this Part presents and analyzes the 
 
Eastern countries, the global war on terror profoundly affected charities on the ground, its impact 
has been much less direct on Islamic charities in Egypt”; see Mona Atia, Innocent Victims: An 
Accounting of Anti-Terrorism in the Egyptian Legal Context, 9 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 
1, 18 (2009−2010). 
 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM  
392 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:389 
 
financing of terrorism offense in the United States and Israel. The 
language of the financing offense in both cases is quite similar in its 
scope of the actus reus it criminalizes and the definition of a terrorist 
organization as the beneficiary of that action, but they differ greatly 
with respect to the mens rea requirement, as will be illustrated ahead. 
A.  United States 
The United States’ efforts to combat terrorism manifests itself in 
many forms. The legal discourse offers extensive surveys of these 
efforts,7 including vast amounts of writing criticizing those measures.8 
With no intention to reiterate those discussions, this part focuses on one 
piece of this complex puzzle, the Providing Material Support or 
Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Act, or 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B.9 This provision warrants special attention in the 
context of combating the financing of terrorism because it is this section 
of the United States criminal code that makes financing foreign terrorist 
organizations a criminal offense. 
Section 2339B(a)(1) makes it an offense to knowingly provide 
material in support of or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, 
and makes it an offense punished by a fine and/or imprisonment. This 
section has been the star of much case law in United States courts; and 
 
 7. For a survey of U.S. anti-terrorism provisions, see Michael W. Ryan, Not All Practice 
Makes Perfect: How the Treasury’s Revised Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Still Fail to 
Adequately Address Charitable Concerns, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 739, 741−47 (2008). See 
also James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 
3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 
L. & INEQUALITY 58, 68−71 (2010) (discussing the correlation between anti-terrorism statutes 
and the penalties prescribed to them). 
 8. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 6, at 452, 463 (arguing that the U.S. government ought to take 
a more rigorous role in monitoring the use of non-profit organizations to finance terrorism and 
that current initiatives do not safeguard the non-profit sector from terrorist abuse); Kent Roach, 
The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorism Financing, 61 UNIV. OF 
TORONTO L. J. 45, 50 (2011) (claiming that current terrorism financing regime are not only 
ineffective, but also their direct and indirect costs far exceed their benefits); Ryan, supra note 7, 
at 751−58 (criticizing the U.S. Treasury’s guidelines regarding charities); Crimm, supra note 6, at 
1353 (criticizing the anti-terrorism legislation in the U.S. as having devastating effects on 
charities). On the contrary, there are also those who support this policy, such as Barkin, who 
argued that even buying air time for commercials on certain Arab radio stations by American 
corporations ought to be considered material support to terrorism. See Angela A. Barkin, 
Corporate America – Making a Killing: An Analysis of Why it is Appropriate to Hold American 
Corporations Who Fund Terrorist Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism, 40 
CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 188–89 (2003). 
 9. For further reading on § 2339B, see David Henrik Pendle, Charity of the Heart and 
Sword: The Material Support Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 783−86 
(2007); Stefanie Dresdner Lincoln, Drawing the Line: Buckley’s Impact on the Intersection of 
Contributions and the First Amendment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 445 (2009); Brian P. 
Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
723 (2005). 
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its constitutionality has been challenged dozens of times,10 most notably 
in the prolonged litigation of the Humanitarian Law Project case,11 
where the plaintiffs claimed it violated both the First and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution. As in many cases before, § 2339B 
dodged the constitutional bullet when the Supreme Court limited its 
analysis to the application of § 2339B to the present case’s 
circumstances, but did not address the principal question of whether this 
statute would be constitutional or not in more difficult cases.12  
These concerns notwithstanding, in comparison to having softer 
legislation, let alone no legislation at all, § 2339B offers few 
advantages. At least one commentator noted that the strength and 
centrality of § 2339B in the American fight against terrorism is that it 
enables the U.S. legal system to prevent terrorist acts ex ante and not 
 
 10. Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, surveys a handful of such 
cases. See United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F.Supp.2d 157, 181–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 
United States v. Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1018 (D. Minn. 2008); see also United States v. 
Shah, 474 F.Supp.2d 492, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also United States v. Marzook, 383 
F.Supp.2d 1056, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also United States v. Assi, 414 F.Supp.2d 707, 718 
(E.D. Mich. 2006); see also United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004); see 
CHARLES DOYLE, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 
2339B, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333 (2010). 
 11. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). The plaintiffs in this 
litigation were two U.S. citizens, five nonprofit groups supporting the terrorist group LTTE, and 
the Humanitarian Law Project, a human rights organization with consultative status to the United 
Nations. Id. at 2713–14. In 1998, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Section 
2339B when they argued it prohibited them from supporting the LTTE and the PKK, both 
designated foreign terrorist organizations, through providing money, tangible aid, legal training, 
and political advocacy. Id. at 2714. The grounds for the statute’s unconstitutionality were 
twofold: first, the statute’s language was too vague so as to render it unconstitutional.  Id. Second, 
the statute arguably violated the plaintiffs’ rights of freedom of speech and freedom of 
association, because “it prohibited their provision of material support without requiring the 
Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those 
organizations.” Id. This litigation went on for twelve long years, during which the case moved 
back and forth different instances, and was complicated further by Congress amending the statute 
twice during that time. The verdict drew much attention and subsequently much scholarly 
writing. For further reading on this topic, see Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material 
Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 455, 480 (2012). Margulies 
defends the Court’s decision, claiming that the Court “fashioned a hybrid approach that blended 
intermediate and heightened scrutiny with the avoidance canon.” See also Adam Tomkins, 
Criminalizing Support for Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 81 (2010), examining the issues arising from the verdict viś-a-viś United Kingdom and 
European Union Law; Pendle supra note 9, at 786–93; John Cerone, Caveat Doctor: 
International Law and the Criminalization of Teaching It, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 487, 
488 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s ruling is inconsistent with legal obligations of the United 
States under International Law). 
 12. This characterizes the approach the United States’ courts took for the most part with 
respect to the constitutional difficulties that arise from anti-terrorism legislation. Without making 
general assertions on whether the relevant statute is constitutional in whole, and not merely as 
applied, the courts will usually rely on common notions rather than legal arguments, such as “the 
law is established that there is no constitutional right to fund terrorism”. See Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief v. John D. Ashcroft et al., 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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settle for only responding to them ex post.13 Additionally, the same 
broad language that is heavily criticized allows United States law 
enforcement authorities to prosecute many forms of terrorist support 
acts, thereby demonstrating a more constructive approach to combating 
terrorism.14 If a terrorist cannot execute his plans without a wide net of 
support, then criminalizing those supporters might prevent the terrorist 
act from happening.15 
This offense constitutes three terms which require further 
clarification. First, the actus reus of the offense—providing material 
support or resources.16 Section 2339B(g)(4) defines “material support or 
resources” by referencing the definition of that term in the neighboring 
clause, § 2339A.17 Section 2339A is the Providing Material Support to 
Terrorists Act, which in contrast to § 2339B, focuses on terrorist acts 
rather than terrorist organizations. Section 2339A(b)(1) defines 
“material support or resources” to include:  
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.18 
This definition is by all accounts a broad one and encompasses 
many forms of support.19 With due regard to the concerns that such 
 
 13. Comerford, supra note 9, at 725−26. 
 14. In Professor Chesney’s article he refers to this advantage as performing two important 
but distinct functions: the “unfocused preventive function” and the “focused preventive function.” 
The former refers to inhibiting the flow of support thus limiting the ability of terrorists to execute 
their plans, and the latter refers to the labeling of supporters of terrorism as personally dangerous. 
See Robert Chesney, The Supreme Court, Material Support, and the Lasting Impact of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. F. 13, 14 (2010). 
 15. This is similar to a discussion from the laws of war paradigm, regarding civilians who 
are direct participants in hostilities. Under this premise, in certain circumstances, civilians lose 
their “civilian immunity” and even though they are not part of the armed forces of a party to a 
conflict, they may be lawfully targeted. The conditions that render a civilian as directly 
participating in the hostilities, or DPH, may vary, but they may include people who provide 
support such as drivers or cooks. Thus, as in the material support statute, the underlying 
assumption is that the commission of a wrongful act requires greater involvement than the one 
pushing the button. The entire support system of the executor must also be viewed as wrong 
doers, because to some degree they enabled the wrongful act to take place. For further reading on 
the subject, see Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Assassination and Preventive Killing, 24 SAIS REV. 
41 (2005). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2009).  
 17. Id. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009).  
 19. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 743, arguing in the name of charity organization, that this 
“sweeping definition includes virtually any type of aid that a charity conceivably grant.” See also 
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language might cause, this article focuses on financial support, probably 
the least controversial form of support; therefore, these concerns do not 
arise in the current context. 
The second concept in the material support offense that generated 
heated discussion is the term “foreign terrorist organization,” or FTO. 
“FTOs are organizations that were designated as such by the Secretary 
of State in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.”20 Under this provision, three criteria must be met in 
order to make such a designation: 1) the entity must be a foreign 
organization; 2) that foreign organization must engage in terrorist 
activity or have the means and intent to do so; and 3) the terrorist 
activity must pose a threat to the national security of the United States 
or its nationals.21 The current list of designated FTOs, as published by 
the Department of State, includes fifty-one organizations.22 
Lastly, the third element of the offense is the mens rea, the 
knowledge requirement.23 To violate § 2339B, a person must have 
knowledge that the organization he or she provided material support to 
was a designated FTO and that it engaged in terrorist activity.24 It is 
interesting to note that the mens rea requirement in § 2339B is much 
broader than the one in §2339A. Section 2339B only requires 
knowledge that the organization is a designated FTO or that the 
organization engaged or engages in terrorist activity, whereas § 2339A 
 
Alexander J. Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial Prosecution in the War on Terror: Examining 
the Unintentional Yet Foreseeable Consequences of Extraterritorially Criminalizing the 
Provisions of Material Support to Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 22 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 313, 332 (2007), asserting that “material support should not be defined so broadly as to 
encompass even mere acts of lodging terrorists.” Professor Cerone also argued that it is a statute 
of “extraordinary breadth of scope, both in terms of the range of conduct it captures as well as its 
jurisdictional sweep.” See Cerone, supra note 11, at 487. Another interesting criticism is made by 
Lombardo, Buwalda and Lyman, who argue that this definition is overly broad so as to render 
victims of totalitarian regimes, who seek refuge in the United States as terrorists or “material 
support[ers],” thus denying them their legitimate right of asylum. See Michele L. Lombardo et al., 
Terrorism, M.aterial Support, The Inherent Right to Self Defense, and the United States 
Obligation to Protect Legitimate Asylum Seekers in a Post-9/11, Post-PATRIOT Act, Post-Real 
ID Act World, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2006). 
 20. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Org., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
 21. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 12 (2006). 
 22. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 20. The listing process is heavily criticized in 
the legal literature. For example, see Roach, supra note 8, at 51, arguing that listing has always 
constituted a problematic exercise because it fuses judicial, executive, and legislative powers in 
proclaiming a person to be an international outlaw without advance notice or a hearing and often 
on the basis of secret intelligence that is never publicly disclosed. See also Donohue, supra note 
5, at 425−28. The listing process in the United States is similar to the process in the United 
Nations under Security Council Resolution 1267. For further reading on this subject, see Craig 
Forcese and Kent Roach, Limping Into the Future: The United Nations 1267 Terrorism Listing 
Process at the Crossroads, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 217, 258 (2010). 
 23. Ryan, supra note 7, at 743. 
 24. Id. 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM  
396 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:389 
 
requires that the defendant have specific intent to further illegal 
activities.25 One possible explanation is that § 2339B was intended to 
prevent terrorist organizations from deceivingly raising funds under the 
pretense of humanitarian aid.26 Another is that § 2339B was designed to 
close a loophole in § 2339A which enabled donors to charity 
organizations to escape the application of the material support clause.27 
Thus, the financing offense under United States law is satisfied 
with a very low mens rea requirement, therefore covering a wide range 
of activities and allowing the possibility to charge almost every activity 
associated with dual-purpose organization as an offense. The 
hypothetical scenario described in Part 3 demonstrates this point. As the 
next sections delve into the Israeli parallel of § 2339B, it is worth noting 
the major difference between these two statutes—the mens rea 
requirement and how that might come into play in the context of dual-
purpose organizations. 
B.  Israel 
The leading statute in Israel governing the field of financing 
terrorism is the Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law (“the Law”).28 
The basic notion underlying the Law is that the financing of a terrorist 
organization, despite it being an action from the private-business sphere, 
poses a real threat to the security of the Israeli public.29 
Article 1 of the Law defines “Terrorist Organization” as an 
association of people, which acts to perpetrate an act of terrorism or has 
as its goal, enabling or promoting the perpetration of an act of 
terrorism.30 The definition also states that it is immaterial “1) whether or 
 
 25. Id. at 743−44. This requirement was subject to much criticism, including calls for 
requiring proof of specific intent rather than the general knowledge currently required, Jonathan 
D. Stewart, Balancing the Scales of Due Process: Material Support of Terrorism and the Fifth 
Amendment, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313 (2005). One commentator even went as far as 
suggesting to amend §2339B so as to require a mens rea of recklessness, see Pendle, supra note 
9, at 778. 
 26. Ryan, supra note 7, at 744. 
 27. McLoughlin, supra note 7, at 65. 
 28. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (ISR.), 
http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/Halbanat+Hon/TerrorFinancingNew.htm (last visited July 25, 
2013). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2−3. “Act of Terrorism” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as:  
an act that constitutes an offence or a threat to commit an act that constitutes 
an offence that was committed or was planned to be committed in order to 
influence a matter of policy, ideology or religion if all of the following 
conditions are fulfilled: it was committed or was planned to be committed with 
the goal of causing fear or panic among the public or with the goal of coercing 
a government or another governing authority, including the government or 
governing authority of a foreign country to take action or to refrain from taking 
action; for the purposes of this paragraph – foreseeing, as a nearly certain 
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not the members of the organization know the identity of the other 
members; 2) if the composition of the members of the organization is 
fixed or changes; [or] 3) if the organization also carries out legal 
activities and if it also acts for legal purposes.”31 
Article 8(a) of the Law prohibits a “transaction in property for the 
purposes of terrorism.”32 It reads as follows: 




 for the purpose 
of enabling, furthering or financing the perpetration of an act of 
terrorism, or to reward the perpetration of an act of terrorism, or for 
the purpose of enabling, furthering or financing the activity of a 
declared terrorist organization or of a terrorist organization shall be 
liable to imprisonment for ten years or a fine that is twenty times 
greater than the fine set in Article 61(a)(4) of the Penal Law.35 
Article 8(b) gives three clarifications with respect to paragraph 
(a).36 First, Article 8(b)(1) deals with the standard of proof that is 
required, and says that “proof that a transaction was performed for one 
of the purposes set forth in [paragraph (a)] is sufficient, even if it was 
 
possibility, that the act or the threat will cause fear or panic among the public 
is equivalent to having a goal to cause fear or panic among the public; the act 
that was committed or that was planned or the threat included: actual injury to 
a person’s body or his freedom, or placing a person in danger of death or 
danger of grievous bodily injury; the creation of actual danger to the health or 
security of the public; serious damage to property; serious disruption of vital 
infrastructures, systems or services; if the aforementioned act or threat was 
committed or was planned to be committed  using weapons as defined in 
Section 144(c)(1) and (3) of the Penal Law, excluding a weapon part or 
accessory, it will be considered an act of terrorism even if the conditions of  
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) are not met, and if it was committed or planned 
to be committed using chemical, biological or radioactive weapons that are 
liable, due to their nature, to cause actual mass harm – even if the conditions 
set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) are not met. 
 31. Id. at 1. 
 32. Id. at 9. 
 33. Id. at 3. “Property transaction” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as:  
acquisition or receipt of ownership or other rights in property, regardless of 
whether any consideration is paid, including solicitation, transfer, receipt, 
possession, exchange, banking transactions, investment, any transaction 
involving securities or possession of securities, brokerage, granting or receipt 
of credit, import, export or creation of a trust or co-mingling of terrorist 
property with other property even if it is not terrorist property. 
 34. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2004, 9 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (ISR.), 
http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/Halbanat+Hon/TerrorFinancingNew.htm (last visited July 25, 
2013). “Property” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as: “immovable and movable property, 
monies and rights, inclusive of property which is the proceeds of any such property, and any 
property accruing or originating from such property or its profit.” 
 35. Id. at 10. 
 36. Id. 
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not proven for which of these purposes specifically.”37 Second, Article 
8(b)(2) defines the term “for the purpose” to include “foreseeing that at 
least one of the possibilities set forth [in paragraph (a)] is a nearly 
certain possibility.”38 And third, Article 8(b)(3) broadens the meaning 
of “to reward the perpetration of an act of terrorism” by establishing 
that it applies “even if the recipient of the reward is not the one who 
perpetrated or planned to perpetrate the act of terrorism.”39 In plain 
language, in order to be charged with the crime of financing terrorism in 
Israel, the defendant needed to have performed a transaction in property, 
with a purpose that this transaction will in some form contribute to 
terrorist activity or of a terrorist organization, even if the direct 
beneficiary is not the terrorist itself.40  
Compared to § 2339B, Article 8(a) seems to be narrower in the 
scope of the criminalized conducts, since on its face, it only covers a 
“transaction in property,”41 while § 2339B deals with a long list of acts 
that constitute “material support.”42 Even though a closer look at the 
Law as a whole reveals that the definitions of “transaction” and 
“property” are quite broad, it is still narrower.43 Because the Law is 
designed to deal specifically with the financing of terrorism, Article 8 
does not cover conducts such as “training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification,” like § 2339A does.44 
In both statutes, the beneficiary of the act is a terrorist 
organization.45 In § 2339B, it is a foreign organization, rendering the 
clause an extraterritorial application.46 In the Israeli Law, there is no 
restriction on the geographical scope: neither the definition of a terrorist 
organization nor the definition of an act of terrorism addresses its 
geographical location.47 Thus, it could also apply extraterritorially. 
The primary difference between these two statutes is the mens rea 
requirement. Whereas § 2339B places the threshold at knowledge that 
the recipient is a designated FTO,48 Article 8(a) sets the bar higher by 
requiring a nexus between the act of the defendant and an act of 
terrorism.49 The purpose of the defendant’s act, according to the Israeli 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 9−10. 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2004, supra note 34, at 10. 
 41. Id. at 9. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(b)(1) (2009).  
 43. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 9.  
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009). 
 45. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 1.  
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).  
 49. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 1.  
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Law, must be an effort to contribute to the terrorist act before its 
commission or to reward the terrorist act after its commission.50 Israeli 
Law also prescribes the general financing of a terrorist organization,51 
but in this context, it is an end in itself, not a conduct, and so distinct 
from the conduct of knowingly financing a designated FTO as described 
in § 2339B.52  
While the Israeli Law does not require that the origin of the 
property be a terrorist activity, the Israel Supreme Court held that if the 
property in question was itself a product of terrorist activity, it might 
suggest its purpose was to further terrorism.53 This flexes the mens rea 
requirement because it enables proof of knowledge of the origin of the 
property to imply knowledge about the future use of that property.  
With this analysis in mind, the next Part turns to presenting the 
phenomenon of dual-purpose organizations, their characteristics and the 
challenges they pose. In order to better convey the moral and policy 
dilemmas such organizations carry, the next part will also examine an 
example of such duality that will be later examined through the lens of 
the two statutes presented in this part.   
III.  DUAL-PURPOSE ORGANIZATIONS 
Dual-purpose organizations include at least two distinct wings that 
differ in their objectives and their actions to achieve those objectives, 
not all of which are necessarily criminal or violent.54 Although this 
concept is not new,55 it is not widely recognized. The definition of just 
how much social non-terrorist activity renders an organization a dual-
purpose one is complex. An extreme approach is demonstrated by 
Professor Levanon who argues, “only an organization the entire 
concerted action of which is directed toward committing terrorist 
 
 50. Id. at 9. 
 51. Id.  
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
 53. Crim.A. 6378/10 Isaweey v. State of Israel, [2010] not published, 12−13. In that case, 
the appellant’s Arab-Israeli lawyer, was accused of financing terrorism because she transferred 
funds from bank accounts of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to bank accounts of security detainees in 
Israeli prisons. The appellate claimed to not know what the purpose of the funds. Nonetheless, the 
Court held that the appellant’s knowledge of the origin of the funds from bank accounts of Hamas 
meant that she knew the funds were proceeds of terrorist activity. Thus she could have foreseen 
with almost complete certainty that these fund would sponsor future terrorist activities.  
 54. Liat Levanon, Criminal Prohibitions on Membership in Terrorist Organizations, 15 
NEW CRIM. L. R. 224, 228 (2012). 
 55. See for example, Pendle, supra note 9, at 781, arguing already in 2007 that “some 
foreign terrorist organizations are categorized as ‘dual method’ organizations because they 
engage in both violent methods and legitimate political or humanitarian efforts,” and that because 
of this characterization, members of such organizations could “conceivably support only peaceful 
projects and need not necessarily endorse their organization’s use of violence.” In a more recent 
writing, the concept of dual-purpose organizations stood as a central element in Levanon, supra 
note 54. 
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attacks should be defined as a terrorist organization.”56 Thus, any 
organization that performs activities other than terrorist ones falls 
outside this high threshold and is by default a dual-purpose 
organization. 
Even if a terrorist organization engages in social or business 
activities to a large extent, it is questionable whether these activities are 
as a matter of fact, distinct from its violent activity. The Israeli High 
Court of Justice contended that “it is impossible to genuinely 
distinguish between the social function of a terrorist organization from 
its violent function, and any such distinction is inherently wrong.”57 
When a contribution is made to the social, non-violent fraction of the 
terrorist organization, it is difficult to guarantee the final destination of 
the money.58  
Among the voices of opposition to the concept of dual-purpose 
organizations is the Supreme Court of the United States which recently 
held, with respect to al-Qaeda lodging facilities, that al-Qaeda should be 
viewed as a single terrorist organization with no non-military wing.59 
The Israel Supreme Court has also recognized that: 
terrorist organizations spend many resources in advocacy and public 
relations, as in non-terrorist activity such as social and humanitarian 
activities, to expand their basis of support as widely as possible 
within the general population and to foster new recruits from that 
population. These activities are conditioned upon a strong financial 
foundation and a large use of financial systems to enable them.
60
 
On the one hand, social institutions operating under the auspices 
and guidance of a terrorist organization can be used as a platform for 
terrorist purposes such as recruiting and propaganda.61  In fact, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
listed terrorism financing schemes using charities to raise or transfer 
funds to support terrorist organizations as one of the most commonly 
 
 56. Isaweey v. State of Israel, supra note 53, at 229, but even Levanon admits that in the 
realm of financing of terrorism specific difficulties arise and the distinction between different 
branches of one organization is somewhat blurred. Id. at 254. 
 57. HCJ 1169/09 Legal Forum for the Land of Israel v. Prime Minister [2009] (Isr.). This 
case revolved around a petition to prohibit the execution of Israeli Government decision allowing 
the transfer of 175 million NIS (roughly 700 million USD) from banks in the West Bank to the 
Gaza Strip through Israel, funds that were designated as salaries of 78,000 employees of the 
Palestinian Authority that resides in the Gaza Strip. The Petitioners argued that such a transaction 
constitutes financing of terrorism.  
 58. Bell, supra note 6, at 456−57. 
 59. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 9, Awad Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 
(2011) (No. 10-1383). 
 60. Crim.A. 3872/06 Ploni v. State of Israel [2007], not published, ¶ 9. 
 61. Margulies, supra note 11, at 484. 
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detected method involving the abuse of charities.62 
On the other hand, many terrorist organizations operate in places 
that lack an organized central government that takes care of the social 
needs of the local population.63 Sometimes, it is the organization itself 
that functions as the de facto government in a defined territory, as the 
population depends on it for welfare and social services.64 Thus, 
building schools, water and sewage systems, establishing clinics and 
youth centers—acts that must be conducted, or at least approved by the 
local municipality—will go through the public officials of the governing 
organization.65 This last argument carries a lot of weight. In the 
previously mentioned Al-Bihani case,66 the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared that al-Qaeda does not have a “non-military” wing, but 
it did so through identifying al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization, as 
opposed to a sovereign state.67  One consequence of refusing to 
recognize the unique form of dual-purpose organizations is that private 
individuals that do business with the non-violent wing of such 
organization will have zero incentive to make further contributions. For 
one thing, they themselves may be subject to designation as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC).68 The best way to understand how dual-purpose 
organizations operate is by closely looking into one, as further explored 
in the next section. 
 
 62. OECD Report on Abuse of Charities for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion, OECD 
11–12 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeofinformation/42232037.pdf [hereinafter OECD 
Report]. 
 63. Margulies, supra note 11, at 484. 
 64. Pendle, supra note 9, at 782. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Awad Al-Bihani v. Obama, supra note 59. 
 67. Id. at 5. On page 9 of the decision, the Court holds that “Unlike a sovereign nation with 
a civilian population, al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization engaged in an armed conflict with the 
United States, and it has no “non-military” wing. Id. at 9. 
 68. Similar to the sanctions imposed on legal persons, a designation as a SDGT enables the 
blocking of all the SDGT’s property and interests in property subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. This was the case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, whose financial support of terrorist 
activities through a charitable organization known as Muwafaq Foundation was one of the main 
reasons of his designation as SDGT. Kadi, a Saudi citizen, challenged his designation in United 
States court, but was denied. The Court acknowledged the fact that the Muwafaq Foundation was 
a charitable organization or performed charitable deeds, but held nonetheless that his fact “does 
not make it immune to designation by OFAC’, thus, implementing the view which does not 
differentiate between branches of a terrorist organization, as will be elaborated ahead in Part 3. 
See Kadi v. Timothy Geithner, No.1:09-cv-00108-JDB, WL 898778, at *22 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 
2012). Another example is the case of the Holy Land Foundation, in which the Court noted that 
“OFAC needed only to determine that Hamas had an interest in [the Foundation’s] property” in 
order to apply financial sanctions on the Foundation. See Holy Land Foundation, supra note 12, 
at 6−7. 
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Case Study: Hamas and the Islamic University in Gaza 
Hamas, “Islamic Resistance Movement,” is a Palestinian Sunni 
fundamentalist Islamic movement, whose goal is to establish an Islamic 
Palestinian state in the land of Israel.69 It was established in 1987 by 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip.70  Currently, 
Hamas exhibits three main branches: the first is a political branch that 
has governed the Gaza strip since 2006;71 second, a military branch 
known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which runs an ongoing 
terrorist campaign against Israel through terrorist acts;72 and the third, a 
civilian-social branch known as the “Dawaa,” which is responsible for 
promoting the welfare of the population in Gaza, by doing things such 
as opening clinics and hospitals, schools and various charities.73 
Is Hamas a dual-purpose organization? Israel, the United States, 
Canada74 and the European Union75 do not recognize the internal 
division of Hamas, and consider the organization as a whole to be a 
single terrorist entity.76 Australia, on the other hand, designated only the 
military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as a terrorist 
organization.77 If we follow the Al-Bihani case, then Hamas should first 
 
 69. JIM ZANOTTI, HAMAS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41514 (2010).  




 71. See Zanotti, supra note 69, at 49. On January 25, 2006 for the first time the Palestinian 
Authority held elections for its leadership and parliament. Hamas won the vast majority of the 
votes, and got seventy-five seats in the parliament, while its major opponent and the acting party, 
the Fatah, received only forty-three seats. Poles held after the elections revealed that the central 
reason among voters for supporting Hamas was their disappointment and distrust of the Fatah 
regime, and not so much their concurrence with Hamas’s political and ideological platform. 
Hamas and Fatah established a combined government. This cooperation notwithstanding, the 
rivalry between Hamas and Fatah grew stronger and violent clashes became more frequent, until 
June 2007, when Hamas too over the Gaza strip and effectively pushing out Fatah influence. On 
June 14, 2006, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, Fatah leader Mahmud Abas, announced the 
cancellation of the unified government and outlawed Hamas. Hamas effectively is the governing 
power over the Gaza Strip, while Fatah remains the legitimate representation of the Palestinian 
Authority and seats in Judea and Samaria. For further reading on Hamas, see SHLOMI ELDAR, 
KNOWING THE HAMAS (2012). 
 72. Zanotti, supra note 69, at 3. 
 73. Id. at 23. 
 74. See Currently Listed Entities, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (Dec. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx. 
 75. 2012 O.J. (L 165) 72 (updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 
2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism and repealing Decision 2011/872/CFSP, lists as a terrorist organization “Hamas,” 
including “Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem”). 
 76. Currently Listed Entities, supra note 74. 
 77. According to the website of the Australian Government, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades were reaffirmed as a terrorist organization as late as August 2012. See Listing of 
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be identified as either closer to an independent organization or to an 
independent state. At this point, there are no voices claiming that the 
Gaza strip is a sovereign nation led by Hamas,78 although nobody 
contests that Hamas is responsible for operating the vast majority of 
every-day services in Gaza; thus it is somewhere in the middle of that 
spectrum. 
A particularly interesting example of the social activity of Hamas 
and of the challenges posed by dual-purpose organizations is the Islamic 
University in Gaza.79 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, 
established the University in 1978.80 It is the leading academic 
institution in Gaza and has over 20,000 students.81 It offers bachelor and 
master’s degrees in various fields, including inter alia electronic 
engineering, education, physics, literature, history and economy.82 The 
University also engages in academic activity and cooperation with 
leading institutions worldwide, such as with the London School of 
Economics.83  
In a research paper published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and 
Terrorism Information Center,84 the Islamic University is presented as 
an academic institution with high reputation, but is also controlled by 
Hamas, and has been used, since its establishment, as a center for 
political, social, cultural and military activity of Hamas.85 Many of 
Hamas’ leaders have either graduated from the Islamic University or 
were members of its faculty.86 It has been claimed by Israel that Izz ad-
Din al-Qassam Brigades use the University’s facilities, such as 
chemistry labs, to develop and manufacture weapons and ammunition, 
 
Terrorism Organisations, supra note 70. 
 78. It is worth mentioning that in this context the attempts by the Palestinian Authority to 
get recognition as an independent state from the United Nation, either by admission to U.N. 
agencies and organizations such as UNESCO or by applying for a status of a member state in the 
U.N. as seen in its formal request to the Security Council in September 2011, and the more 
successful application of a non-member state status at the General Assembly in November 2012. 
In any matter, if and when such application will meet the approval of the U.N., the Palestinian 
state will include the Gaza strip. For further reading on this subject, see Ron Prosor, What Kind of 
Palestinian State?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 28, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146773248664676.html. 
     79. See ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY - GAZA, 
http://www.iugaza.edu.ps/en/About/IntrducingIug.aspx. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.   
 83. Id.  
 84. Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, Islamic University in Gaza: 
Academic Institution Dominated by Hamas, Assisted by External Factors, Including Western 
Countries (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_10_090_1.pdf (Heb.). 
 85. Thanassis Cambanis, Hamas U, BOSTON.COM (Feb. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/28/hamas_u/. 
 86. Id. 
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and that the University is also a major recruiting hub for Hamas.87 It 
should also be mentioned that the University was targeted by the Israel 
Defense Force during operation Cast Lead on December 2008.88  
A hypothetical yet realistic scenario deals with a United States-
based foundation set out to help encourage young Palestinians in Gaza 
to pursue higher education, with the thought that it will enable them to 
find better jobs, expose them to different ideas and pose an alternative 
to becoming active supporters of the military fraction of Hamas. To 
further that end, the foundation donates a generous sum of money to 
build a new library of humanities in the Islamist University.89 Would 
such a project constitute an offense of financing terrorism under United 
States or Israeli law? The following part answers “yes” to both cases. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Legal analysis is much like mathematics—we take a certain set of 
facts, put them in a formula and calculate the result. Sometimes it is 
easy and other times the numbers just do not add up. Sometimes the 
result comes with almost no effort, which makes you think that either 
you did something wrong, or there is a problem with the formula. The 
hypothetical scenario described above belongs to the latter category, 
and as will be illustrated below, the current law and formula are far 
from satisfactory. Both United States and Israeli law will regard 
donating a new humanities library to the Islamic University as a 
criminal offense of financing terrorism.  
As explained in Part 2.A. above, the scenario must meet three 
requirements in order for it to be a criminal offense under § 2339B. 
First, the provision of funds must be considered “material support.” The 
definition in § 2339A(b)(1) clearly answers this question in the 
affirmative, when it includes in its definition “currency or monetary 
instruments.” Second, the funds must be directed to a designated FTO. 
This is clear since Hamas is almost an honorary member of the 
Department of State’s FTO list. And third, the generous donors must 
know Hamas is a designated FTO. Irrespective of the level of awareness 
of the average American donor, a person desiring to help the population 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Israel Strikes Key Hamas Offices, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co/uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7802515.stm.  
 89. To illustrate that such a scenario is not farfetched, it is interesting to read Donohue’s 
criticism about the United State’s campaign against Muslim charities, in which the following 
example is brought, “Al-Sanabil Association for Relief and Development, established in 1993 in 
response to UNRWA budget cuts, sponsored 1,200 Palestinian families, spending approximately 
$800,000 in 2003 on orphans and $55,000 on needy patients. The organization also distributed 
food and home appliances to displaced persons. Treasury [of the United States] froze the group’s 
assets in August 2003, claiming that its funds went through Hamas. Those previously benefiting 
from the organization witnessed the devastating affect . . . .” See Donohue, supra note 5, at 423. 
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in Gaza likely has at least vague understanding of what Hamas are 
engaged in, even if they do not have a full account of its terrorist record. 
Since this mens rea requirement is very low, this criterion will probably 
be met in such circumstances. 
A similar result was reached in the United States regarding the 
alleged funding of housing units for Al-Eman University in Sanaa, 
Yemen.90  There, a Saudi citizen was designated a SDGT by OFAC on 
account of his financing support to terrorist organizations, inter alia, 
through allocating funds to the University’s aforementioned housing 
project.91 In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that “even allowing 
for good-intentioned financial support to organizations and individuals 
involved in terrorism would be problematic, as organizations could free 
up other resources to be used towards violent terrorist objectives.”92 
As to Israeli law, the Law clearly covers the directing of funds as a 
primary prohibited conduct. The more difficult task is proving that the 
transfer of funds was done with the intent to further a terrorist act, to 
reward it, or to finance the actions of a terrorist organization. Since 
Hamas is the founder and owner of the University, a case could be made 
for at least two of these purposes. While it is unlikely to establish that 
such a contribution was made to reward a terrorist act, it may very well 
be established that the donation was made for the purpose of furthering 
a terrorist act or to finance the activities of Hamas, a terrorist 
organization by definition of the Law.  
Any lack of clarity in Article 8(a) that may cast doubt on its 
relevance to the scenario at hand is made up for in the definitions clause 
that follows it. As mentioned above,93 when Article 8(a) states “for the 
purpose” of any of those three results, it actually means foreseeing that 
at least one of those possibilities is a near certain possibility.94 Hence, 
the generous donors need not intend for their money to assist in the 
commission of a terrorist act or to help balance the financial sheets of 
Hamas. They simply need to recognize that there is a good chance that 
it will happen. Hamas’ notorious reputation, for example, for using 
civilian population contrary to the laws of war, holding an IDF soldier 
in captivity contrary to the third Geneva Conventions and engaging in 
other acts of terror, makes any other assumption a ridiculous one.  
After applying two anti-terrorism statutes to a hypothetical case, 
the result is that what may have been a genuinely good deed “goes 
punished.” This in turn will deter future well-intentioned donors and 
will pose serious questions about the purpose of it all—are those laws 
 
 90. Kadi v. Timothy Geithner, supra note 68. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 54. 
 93. See Part 2.B. above. 
 94. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, § 8(b)(2). 
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really suppressing terrorism? Or are they just enabling terrorist 
organizations to have their way with large numbers of civilians simply 
because nobody else will set an alternative?  
Having Hamas as the controlling entity leaves no option for outside 
funding because of the prohibitions against financial support, and 
thereby forces the local population to rely on Hamas for providing basic 
services—and Hamas is willing to do so.  The proposed funding might 
be misused and not allocated to building the library, or it will be used 
for that purpose but, as a result, will enhance Hamas’ popularity within 
the local community and free up funds for terrorist use.  Neither option 
is desired. The following conclusion will discuss the complex policy 
considerations involved in anti-terrorist financing laws. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
As shown in the previous part, the applicability of anti-terrorism 
financing laws to dual-purpose organizations may bring about absurd 
results. This part will conclude the discussion, presenting both sides of 
the scale. This part argues that while this absurdity should not be 
overlooked, regarding the final balance between continuing to apply the 
statutes as they are and amending them so as to address such special 
cases, the stakes for abusing the latter option are grave enough to render 
the status quos the best course of action, at least for the time being.  
In addition to the realistic fear of a misuse of contributions, 
another argument in favor of criminalizing support of the non-military 
wing of dual-purpose organizations is that such organizations hold even 
greater leverage over the population and thus possess various means to 
coerce a population to participate in its terrorist activity.95 For instance, 
a resident of Gaza will have a much harder time refusing support to 
Hamas if the sanctions that he might suffer on account of his refusal 
include potential cut power lines to his home and loss of education 
rights to his children. 
Some scholars criticize this line of thought. Professor Crimm, for 
example, aptly argues that anti-terrorism financing legislation may bring 
about the exact opposite result than intended, because legislation 
unintentionally forces the public further into the arms of terrorist 
organizations by banning legitimate sources of funding.96 Thus, as long 
as we refuse to acknowledge the welfare projects run by these 
 
 95. Levanon, supra note 54, at 266. 
 96. Crimm, supra note 6, at 1450, where she challenges the core rationale of the anti-
terrorism financing legislation, stating that “a wholesale blight on the provision of financial 
support for humanitarian aid, the promotion of health, the enhancement of education and other 
charitable causes, the facilitation of economic development, the building of social capital, and the 
strengthening of social stability could fuel the destabilization of struggling people abroad and 
enhance the appeal of terrorist groups to these people.” 
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organizations and peg them as subject to outside influence, we leave the 
general population with no other choice but to turn to the terrorist 
organization to control their life. By this logic, prudent support directed 
to certain social projects may actually assist in diverting public opinion 
away from their former terrorist patron.97 
These arguments come down to the following equilibrium. On one 
end of the scale is the desire to promote welfare and quality of life to 
populations controlled by terrorist organizations. A person that is 
securely employed, educated, able to feed his family, and who promises 
his children a solid future, is likely less eager to participate in terrorist 
activity. On the other end is the grim reality that at the end of the day, 
these dual-purpose organizations simply did not earn the right to enjoy 
the benefit of the doubt. The abuse of well-intended funds and projects 
speak for itself. It makes little difference that the money is intended to 
fund a valuable desired project if, de facto, it funds more violence and 
terrorism. The original intention of the donation does not make the 
result any less destructive.98   
In sum, building a new library of the humanities at the Islamist 
University would probably go a long way. But there is a chance, and 
unfortunately not a small one, that some of the money donated to this 
project will end up funding terrorist acts. The critics should not be 
underestimated. More thorough research is needed to determine the 
legal, legitimate ways around the pockets of the terrorist organizations, 
because the fight against terrorism is not just in the battlefield and in the 
courtrooms. It is also in places such as the Library of the Humanities at 
a University in Gaza.  
 
 97. Pendle, supra note 9, at 87, making a similar distinction to the one made by Crimm, and 
even further, encouraging American donations that “may help ameliorate intolerable conditions in 
the most desperate corners of the world and could consequently be an invaluable tool in the War 
on Terrorism”. See generally Levanon, supra note 53, at 229. 
 98. Barkin, supra note 8, at 193. 
